WASHINGTON, D.C. –– Today, House Committee on Homeland Security Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino (R-NY) and House Select Committee on China Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI) released a joint investigative report detailing the national security, cybersecurity,…

News originally published by

U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security

WASHINGTON, D.C. –– Today, House Committee on Homeland Security Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino (R-NY) and House Select Committee on China Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI) released a joint investigative report detailing the national security, cybersecurity, and economic security implications of U.S. companies integrating open-weight artificial intelligence (AI) models developed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into consumer platforms, enterprise software, and systems with access to sensitive commercial or personal information. Read more in CNBC.

The joint investigation examined the provenance of these models, the data and techniques used to train them, whether their capabilities were advanced through unauthorized distillation from leading U.S. systems, and how they are being repackaged, deployed, or made available to companies in the United States and around the world. As part of that work, the Committees also examined whether the United States has a sufficient open-weight AI strategy to ensure American companies and cyber defenders are not forced to choose between expensive or proprietary U.S. models and cheap, capable PRC-developed alternatives.

The Committees’ investigation was launched in April 2026 and included correspondence with three U.S. companies: Airbnb, which uses Alibaba models in customer support; Anysphere, which built the flagship proprietary model in its Cursor coding platform on a Moonshot AI base model; and DoorDash, which reported that multiple PRC model families had been authorized and deployed. The Committees engaged in productive discussions with the companies regarding the technical, commercial, and security considerations surrounding their evaluation and use of PRC-developed open-weight models. 

The Chairmen provide 12 policy recommendations in the report, centering on the need to build the American open-weight alternative, know which models are running in sensitive systems, share threat information and strengthen defenses, impose costs on illicit extraction, and set durable rules with allies. Building on the Department of Homeland Security’s order excluding DeepSeek from federal civilian agency systems, the Chairmen call for prohibiting PRC-developed models in federal systems and federal contract work, removing them from high-risk functions of critical infrastructure, and barring the use of federal cybersecurity grant funds to buy them. The Committees have provided the findings and recommendations in this report to help lawmakers, agencies, and companies make informed decisions to protect U.S. systems, critical infrastructure, and our economic and national security. The Committees will continue their oversight of these issues.

In the Foreword of the report, Chairmen Garbarino and Moolenaar write, in part:

“The investigation uncovered risks that American businesses, policymakers, and national security officials can no longer afford to overlook or downplay. From Silicon Valley startups to Fortune 500 companies, American businesses are increasingly adopting PRC-developed open-weight models because they are inexpensive, customizable, and competitive with leading American systems. Federal investigations, however, have found that major PRC developers used proxy networks and fraudulent accounts to harvest outputs from American frontier models and replicate their capabilities. While America is investing billions and racing to build ‘Super Intelligence,’ Beijing is using stolen intelligence to close the gap.”

“Congress has too often been behind the curve on emerging technology. As one of our colleagues observed after a briefing on these issues, AI is advancing so quickly that Congress risks being ‘light years behind.’ With this investigation, we intend to narrow that gap. We should not wait five years to discover that much of the world, and much of the United States, runs on AI shaped by the CCP, leaving policymakers with little choice but another costly rip and replace effort. The time to act is now, while we still have the opportunity and leverage to do so.”

Read the full report here. Highlights of the report can be found below.

Findings:

  1. PRC-developed open-weight models are already widely used across the American economy, but much of that use is hard to track.
  2. Cost, customization, and near-frontier performance are driving adoption, and the United States lacks a competitive open-weight alternative at the price and performance the market demands.
  3. Much of the PRC’s apparent progress rests on capabilities extracted from American models, and American data-labeling firms are helping supply the data that trains PRC models.
  4. Beijing is using open-weight distribution, state support, and low prices to expand global dependence on PRC models, while the terms of that dependence are beginning to change.
  5. The risks are increasing as PRC models become more capable, while their behavior and security properties can differ in ways ordinary evaluations may not detect.

Policy Recommendations:

  1. Launch a national American open-weight AI initiative.
  2. Make trusted American AI the global default.
  3. Establish a model provenance standard and an AI bill of materials.
  4. Extend federal restrictions beyond DeepSeek, keep PRC-developed AI models out of federal contract work and high-risk functions of critical infrastructure, and give agencies the visibility to enforce these restrictions.
  5. Secure long-term information-sharing authorities and build a developer-level AI threat channel.
  6. Evaluate PRC models systematically, translate the results into guidance, and give the Information Technology Sector a single accountable federal partner.
  7. Prepare DHS and CISA to defend at machine speed and secure AI agents on federal networks.
  8. Make CISA the single point of submission for AI-related cyber incident reports and establish an independent board to investigate significant incidents.
  9. Hold illicit distillers accountable and close the gray market.
  10. Examine sales of American training data to PRC AI laboratories.
  11. Govern both closed and open models and avoid overregulation.
  12. Work with allies and deepen understanding of PRC strategy.

Background:

Over the past seven months, the Committees conducted the investigation through document requests, company briefings, review of company productions and written responses, and classified briefings, and consulted frontier AI developers, cybersecurity executives, federal agencies, industry leaders, and academic researchers. The review also drew on an expanding body of public and government research. The House Committee on Homeland Security continues to engage with the private sector on AI through roundtables, briefings, and hearings on the future of cybersecurity and best practices for developing secure AI technology. 

The new report comes as the PRC has intensified its efforts to close the AI innovation gap with leading U.S. frontier labs through model distillation, intellectual property theft, and other illicit means. In September 2026, the National Security Agency (NSA), CISA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a joint advisory warning of the national security impacts of these large-scale distillation efforts against American AI companies, particularly as the PRC utilizes advanced AI models to increase the scale, scope, and speed of its intrusions into U.S. systems.

In May, Anthropic provided Committee Members with one of the first live demonstrations of Mythos given to Congress, allowing Members to see firsthand how advanced AI can find software vulnerabilities. The demonstration reinforced the urgency of ensuring that federal agencies, including our civilian cyber defenders, can responsibly use advanced U.S. models to find and patch vulnerabilities. 

In June, the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection convened a hearing to examine how AI is transforming the cybersecurity landscape and reshaping the resilience of America’s critical infrastructure, as well as policy solutions to secure our networks, strengthen America’s domestic technology base, and ensure the United States maintains its leadership in emerging technologies.

In September 2025, Chairman Garbarino introduced the “Widespread Information Management for the Welfare of Infrastructure and Government Act,” or WIMWIG Act, which would enhance and extend the “Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015” for the next decade. The bill improves voluntary, real-time information sharing on cyber threats between federal and non-federal entities and preserves the original law’s privacy protections. Rep. Andy Ogles (R-TN), Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection chairman, introduced the “Protecting Information by Local Leaders for Agency Resilience Act,” or PILLAR Act, to reauthorize DHS’s State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program. The program provides grants to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to address cybersecurity risks and threats to information systems and operational technology systems, including those using artificial intelligence. The Committee on Homeland Security advanced both pieces of legislation in a bipartisan markup. 

###

Legal Disclaimer:

EIN Presswire provides this news content "as is" without warranty of any kind. We do not accept any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information contained in this article. If you have any complaints or copyright issues related to this article, kindly contact the author above.

Share this page:

Advanced Search Options

Search for:

Search scope:

Type:

Search in:

Date range:

The last

Sort by:

Sign up for:

One World Daily Brief

The daily local news briefing you can trust. Every day. Subscribe now.

By signing up, you agree to our Terms & Conditions.